Sunday, 20 May 2018

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scarpe louis vuitton outlet online A standard for our aesthetic and ethical judgments

Let us start with an example. I have to judge an aesthetic case: there are three faces in front of me, and I have to say whether they are beautiful, average, or ugly. They are quite different. The first one is characterized by symmetrical features, brown eyes, brown hair, a medium nose, and a medium mouth. The second one is characterized by symmetrical features, light brown eyes, red hair, a medium nose, and a medium mouth. The third one is characterized by asymmetrical features, light brown eyes, red hair, a very big nose, and a very small mouth. How am I going to judge the three faces? Is there any face judgeable beautiful, and why? Is there any face judgeable average, and why? And is there any face judgeable ugly, and why? I may say that I am likely to judge as follows: the first face is beautiful, the second face is average, and the third face is ugly. But why? And, moreover, are my judgments sensible?

Let us continue with another example. I have to judge an ethical case: there are three people in front of me, who are going to act in three ways, and I have to say whether their actions are good, average, or bad. Their actions are quite different. The first one is to sign a document stating the first person will not to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation. The second one is not to sign any document about active euthanasia in a painful health situation. The third one is to sign a document stating the third person will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation. How am I going to judge the three actions? Is there any action judgeable good, and why? Is there any action judgeable average, and why? And is there any action judgeable bad, and why? I may say that I am likely to judge as follows: the first action is good, the second action is average, and the third action is bad. But why? And, moreover, are my judgments sensible?

In the following pages, I will try to argue that Kant notion of ideal can promisingly guide us in making the aforesaid aesthetic and ethical judgments.

Kant is the philosopher who introduces the distinction between what an ideal is and what an idea is[1]. For instance, and with it human wisdom in its entire purity, are ideas. Therefore, he defines the idea as what the rule (Kant 1781: A 570/B 598) and the ideal as original image for the thoroughgoing determination of the [real] copy (Kant 1781: A 570/B 598). More precisely, ideal is thus the original image (prototypon) of all things, which all together, as defective copies (ectypa), take from it the matter for their possibility, and yet although they approach more or less nearly to it, they always fall infinitely short of reaching it (Kant 1781: A 578/B 606). And in the Critique of the Power of Judgment he adds that signifies, strictly speaking, a concept of reason, and ideal the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea (Kant 1790: 5: 232). For instance,

that archetype of taste, which indeed rests on reason indeterminate idea of a maximum, but cannot be represented through concepts, but only in an individual presentation, would better be called the ideal of the beautiful, something that we strive to produce in ourselves even if we are not in possession of it. But it will be merely an ideal of the imagination, precisely because it does not rest on concepts but on presentation, and the faculty of presentation is the imagination. (Kant 1790: 5: 232)

Let us highlight three essential characteristics of Kant ideal (characteristics which are essential for our argument as well):

1. the ideal is aesthetic at its roots, because it is an a a an a which results from the exercise of the ideal is imaginable, and not realizable: its ontology is that of imagination, and not that of reality, because it merely in thoughts and fall infinitely short of reaching it the ideal is produced, and not given, because it is that we strive to produce in ourselves and something that are not in possession of let us ask, together with Kant, do we attain such an ideal (Kant 1790: 5: 232)? Kant answers as follows: are two elements involved here: first, the aesthetic normal idea, which is an individual intuition (of the imagination) that represents the standard for judging (Kant 1790: 5: 233), the idea of reason, which makes the ends of humanity insofar as they cannot be sensibly represented into the principle for the judging of its figure, through which, as their effect in appearance, the former are revealed (Kant 1790: 5: 233). The latter, namely, idea of reason entails that any ideal has to do with expression of the moral (Kant 1790: 5: 235). The former, namely, aesthetic normal idea entails that any ideal has the following genesis, which is essential for our argument: imagination

even knows how, by all accounts actually if not consciously, as it were to superimpose one image on another and by means of the congruence of several of the same kind to arrive at a mean that can serve them all as a common measure. Someone has seen a thousand grown men. Now if he would judge what should be estimated as their comparatively normal size, then (in my opinion) the imagination allows a great number of images (perhaps all thousand) to be superimposed on one another, and, if I may here apply the analogy of optical presentation, in the space where the greatest number of them coincide and within the outline of the place that is illuminated by the most concentrated colors, there the average size becomes recognizable, which is in both height and breadth equidistant from the most extreme boundaries of the largest and smallest statures; and this is the stature for a beautiful man. (Kant 1790: 5: 234)

In particular, in a similar way there is sought for this average man the average head, the average nose, etc., then this shape is the basis for the normal idea of the beautiful man in the country where this comparison is made (Kant 1790: 5: 234). Let us analyse the meaning of aesthetic normal idea which is the first condition for the genesis of the ideal. Speaking of mean means speaking of the following process: if my eyes see, for instance, ten totally deformed men out of a thousand men, then the also results from them the ideal of the beautiful man also results from totally deformed men, as any ideal also results the most extreme boundaries us keep analysing the meaning of aesthetic normal idea by focusing on the following argument by Kant: normal idea is not derived from the proportions taken from experience, as determinate rules; rather it is in accordance with it that rules for judging first become possible (Kant 1790: 5: 234), which means that the is extremely important, because it is precisely the that determines the for judging When I judge, for instance, that the man X is beautiful because his body is perfectly proportioned, the actual meaning of my judgment is the following: I recognize the perfect proportions of his body as the for judging not because they are perfect in themselves, but because they happen to more or less nearly to the In the first case (they are perfect in themselves), I should say that a proportion P(X) is perfect a priori. Therefore, given the perfect proportion P(X), the man X, who happens to correspond quite accurately to the perfect proportion P(X), is judged beautiful. In the second case (they happen to more or less nearly to the I should say that a proportion P(X) is perfect a posteriori. Therefore, given the proportion P(X) of the man X, the proportion P(Y) of the man Y, the proportion P(Z) of the man Z, and so forth, the man X, who happens to correspond quite accurately to the of the proportions P(X), P(Y), P(Z), and so forth, is judged beautiful (the man Y, who happens to correspond less accurately to the of the proportions P(X), P(Y), P(Z), and so forth, is judged average, and the man Z, who happens not to correspond in the least to the of the proportions P(X), P(Y), P(Z), and so forth, is judged ugly). There are two interesting consequences to highlight:

1. firstly, Kant ideal entails that, paradoxically enough, there is a precise sense in which the most beautiful is the most average: the most beautiful is the What I am actually saying when I judge the man X to be beautiful is that he happens to more or less nearly to the given by all the men I see the country where this comparison is made secondly, Kant ideal entails that, paradoxically enough, there is a precise sense in which the most beautiful is also made by the ugliest. Therefore, for instance, the man Z, who happens not to correspond in the least to the which results from the men X, Y, Z, and so forth, and who is judged ugly, also makes the man X beautiful.

Now, let us analyse Kant argument about what the ideal is for, an argument which is essential for our reasoning. In the Critique of Pure Reason he argues that, once we have produced the ideal (any ideal) through both the exercise of our imagination and the exercise of our reason, have in us no other standard for our actions than the conduct of this divine human being, with which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the standard (Kant 1781: A 569/B 597), because ideals, even though one may never concede them objective reality (existence), are nevertheless not to be regarded as mere figments of the brain; rather, they provide an indispensable standard for reason, which needs the concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, in order to assess and measure the degree and the defects of what is incomplete (Kant 1781: A 569/B 597 A 570/B 598).

Kant argues that the ideal as standard for our judgments works in two essential ways. The reason why an aesthetic judgment founded on the ideal never be purely aesthetic is that the ideal also results from idea of reason which entails expression of the moral But a more meaningful reason may be added: speaking about the ideal (about any ideal) is speaking about an aesthetic dimension (the ideal is an a a an a which strengthens an ethical dimension (the ideal works for our acting, after having worked for our judging). For instance, the ideal of the beautiful human being is an which, precisely through the vivid power distinctively possessed by an aesthetic exemplar, can more easily make us judge the imperfections of our beauty and act in order to improve it, and the ideal of the good human being is an which, precisely through the vivid power distinctively possessed by an aesthetic exemplar, can more easily make us judge the imperfections of our goodness and act in order to improve it.

We already know that the ideal is produced, and not given, because it is that we strive to produce in ourselves and something that are not in possession of In particular, Kant gives us an extremely clear example: under these empirical conditions a Negro must necessarily have a different normal idea of the beauty of a figure than a white, a Chinese person a different idea from a European (Kant 1790: 5: 234). I am likely to judge the first face (characterized by symmetrical features, brown eyes, brown hair, a medium nose, and a medium mouth) beautiful because I am Italian, and the first face happens to more or less nearly to the of the faces of country where this comparison is made But I am likely to change, and I am actually already changing, my judgment as my ideal of the beautiful face quite quickly shifts because the of the faces of country where this comparison is made quite quickly shifts as well. In particular, I continuously experience several faces and several faces. In this case, the important lesson I learn from Kant is the following: the inclusiveness of the ideal helps me understand that any ideal is supposed to shift as my empirical experience shifts, because the ideal actually has an empirical genesis the inclusiveness of the ideal helps me understand that any ideal is not fixed at all (as any totalitarianism would assert), but that it is shifting. Therefore, it does not even make sense to assert that, since my ideal of the beautiful face is that of the white face, then, considering my judgments, I will always judge faces and faces ugly and, considering my actions, I will always avoid intimate relationships with human beings and human beings. I am likely to judge the first action (to sign a document stating the first person will not to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation) good because I am Italian, and the first action happens to more or less nearly to the of the ways of thinking of country where this comparison is made (supposing the first person wants to get ready for a possible future change, regarding the laws of his own country or to move to other countries characterized by other laws). Let us keep referring to the example: I am likely to judge the second action (not to sign any document about active euthanasia in a painful health situation) average because I am Italian, and the second action happens to less accurately the of the ways of thinking of country where this comparison is made and I am likely to judge the third action (to sign a document stating the third person will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation) bad because I am Italian, and the third action happens not to in the least the of the ways of thinking of country where this comparison is made (supposing the third person wants to get ready for a possible future change, regarding the laws of his own country or to move to other countries characterized by other laws).

We may start from the following remark: paradoxically enough, there is frequently a divergence between judging and legislating. More precisely, we may describe what frequently happens as follows:

1. as Kant teaches us, we judge on the basis of our ideals as for reason but, contra Kant lesson, we decide to forcedly consider our ideals to be fixed, and not to be shifting (we even decide to forcedly consider our ideals something that regresses through changes, rather than something that progresses through changes, something that we must save from changes, rather than something that we must save through changes);

3. therefore, we forcedly use exclusive, and not inclusive, ideals: we forcedly use ideals which result from mean (wrongly) considered as the way of thinking of the majority of country where this comparison is made (for instance, the Catholic way of thinking, if the country is Italy), and not (rightly) considered as resulting from the ways of thinking of the majority and the minorities of country where this comparison is made (for instance, resulting from the Catholic, atheist, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and so forth, ways of thinking, if the country is Italy);

4. therefore, when we proceed from judging to legislating, we write exclusive, and not inclusive, laws: we write laws which (wrongly) protect the majority (for instance, a law according to which no citizen can choose active euthanasia in a painful health situation), and not laws which (rightly) protect the majority and the minorities (for instance, a law according to which the choice of active euthanasia in a painful health situation is up to each citizen, who can choose it or not on the basis of his own ideal of what constitutes the good man way of thinking about the relationship between life and death).

Indeed, we should not use the inclusiveness of the ideal if the case is that of a way thinking, firstly, and a way of acting, secondly, which are supposed to determine choices impacting other people lives, rather than choices impacting one own life. More precisely, any action of ours can influence other people choices over their own lives (if I commit suicide, then I can influence your choice of committing suicide as well, if you love me, or of celebrating, if you hate me), but we should try to distinguish between influencing and determining and we may argue that we should try to use the inclusiveness of the ideal anytime we are not determining other people choices over their own lives.

Therefore, the judgments from which we started are typical judgments in which we should try to use the inclusiveness of the ideal. More precisely, what if, through the inclusiveness of the ideal, we try to decrease the divergence between judging and legislating in the case of euthanasia? We may describe what should happen as follows:

1. as Kant teaches us, we judge on the basis of our ideals as for reason and, pro Kant lesson, we consider our ideals to be shifting (we even consider our ideals something that progresses through changes, something that we must save through changes);

3. therefore, we use inclusive ideals: we use ideals which result from mean considered as the result of the ways of thinking of the majority and the minorities of country where this comparison is made (for instance, the result of the religious and atheist ways of thinking about what constitutes the good man way of thinking about the relationship between life and death in the case of euthanasia, if the country is Italy);

4. therefore, when we proceed from judging to legislating, we write inclusive laws: we write laws which protect the majority and the minorities (for instance, a law according to which the choice of active euthanasia in a painful health situation is up to each citizen, who can choose it or not on the basis of his own ideal of what constitutes the good man way of thinking about the relationship between life and death). And, moreover, we think that it does not even make sense to assert that, since the majority ideal of what constitutes the good man way of thinking about the relationship between life and death is religious, then, if we consider our legislating, we will always legislate contra active euthanasia and, if we consider our acting, we will always avoid intimate relationships with human beings who sign a document stating their will to accept active euthanasia in a painful health situation.

The examples considered make us reason about a most meaningful issue: why do we frequently find a divergence between judging and legislating? More precisely, why do we frequently legislate on the basis of a criterion according to which what guides us is mean which (wrongly) coincides with the way of thinking of the majority, even if, following Kant argument, our for judging which is the ideal, is founded on mean which (rightly) coincides with the result of the ways of thinking of the majority and the minorities?

The answer seems to be given by the example of killing: the majority, which believes in the ideal good man cannot kill beyond the limit of self defence decides to be guided by mean which coincides with the ideal good man cannot kill beyond the limit of self defence in order to protect its own possibility of choosing from the minority, which believes in the ideal good man can kill beyond the limit of self defence But what if we substitute the ideal good man can kill beyond the limit of self defence with something that does not entail the protection of the majority own possibility of choosing? Again, this is the case of several aesthetic and ethical judgments:
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